The Idea of Social Science and Proper Phenomenology by Jonathan Tuckett

Author:Jonathan Tuckett
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

Rationality , it is heavily implied, is determined by a system of relevances that are in turn determined by the stock of knowledge of the person’s biographical situation. But this is to say no more than the postulate of relevancy. Indeed, this is the very reason I have abandoned it. A person’s interests are determined by a problem which determines what the relevant conditions are regardless of whether that problem be religious, artistic, or scientific.

Let us say that my “problem at hand” is to catch a train. This requires a degree of clarity because I need the relevant knowledge of where I am and where the train is. But the level of clarity needed for me to solve the problem does not require knowledge of the exact GPS co-ordinates of my home, only the knowledge that my home is seven streets away from the train station. Let us say further that the train leaves in fifteen minutes. I must then determine a route that will get me to the station within that time which requires knowledge of which routes I have taken in the past, or others have taken, which cover the distance in the requisite time—i.e. a verified route. In this I may come to the conclusion that there are two routes available that take eight and ten minutes respectively. If I choose to take the ten minute route I am acting no less rationally than if I took the faster route because both meet the relevant conditions of catching the train within fifteen minutes. Indeed, I may have factored into my choice of route the fact that the slower route is more aesthetically pleasing. This then brings us to the logical consistency of the act of catching the train, for as Schutz noted it must sit within a system of actions. Catching the train at that time is necessary for getting to work which is necessary for earning money which is necessary for others things and so on. That I have chosen the slower route factors into this logical consistency because walking a pleasing route improves my mood which improves my frame of mind for working, thereby having a knock-on effect.

It must be emphasised that the clear and distinct knowledge required is dependent upon the “problem at hand”. In the case of each of these postulates it is possible for me to have “clearer and more distinct” knowledge of them but this extra knowledge is irrelevant to solving the problem. In “common-sense” rationalitie s, clear and distinct knowledge solves the problem. Where scientific rationality differs is that clear and distinct knowledge is the problem to be solved. Schutz himself concludes ‘that “rational action” on the common-sense level is always within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted’ (1962b, 33). By virtue of this typicality , however,the more standardised the prevailing action pattern is, the more anonymous it

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